GHN is
offering an article originally published by EurasiaNet.org, which mainly describes what turned out from Abkhazia’s
hopes of economic benefit from Sochi Olimpics.
From the
shores of the Black-Sea resort town of Gagra, situated in the separatist
territory of Abkhazia, you can see the glow of the Olympic flame in Sochi, just
under 60 kilometers away. For many locals, the light in the night serves mainly
as a reminder of unmet expectations.
When Russia
won the bid to host the Winter Olympics, many presumed Abkhazia would see some
economic spillover given that Sochi is just across the border. But instead of
getting a piece of the action, Abkhazia has been shut out.
Diplomatic
expediency is one reason for Abkhazia’s woes. The territory broke free from
Georgia in 1994. Following Tbilisi’s war with Russia in 2008, the Kremlin
recognized Abkhazia’s independence, along with that of another separatist
entity, South Ossetia. The problem is few other states have followed Russia’s
lead, meaning that Abkhazia remains in international diplomatic limbo. In
addition, security concerns have prompted Russia to keep Abkhazia at arm’s
length.
Since 2009,
Russia has provided the territory with roughly $67 million a year in direct
budgetary support, according to a 2013 study by the International Crisis Group.
In 2012, assistance from Moscow amounted to 70 percent of Abkhazia’s de-facto
state budget.
The heavy
subsidization prompted talk that Abkahzia might provide building materials for
Sochi, construct housing near the border for laborers and host Olympic guests
in its hotels and Soviet-era sanatoria. In reality, though, the only business
that picked up was the export of gravel.
Hopes that the
territory’s many unemployed residents could find construction work amid the
Sochi building boom never panned out. Russian organizers preferred to bring in
labor migrants from other areas. “At first we were glad” about the Winter
Games, said Aliona Kuvichko, the director of a Sokhumi-based non-governmental
organization called the Association Inva-Sodeystvie (AIS). “There were
discussions of opening the airport and seaport. But, in the end, nothing. No
economic effect.”
Kuvichko
attributed the missed opportunity to Abkhazia’s political inability to forge a
vision for its economic future. Critics charge that, rather than developing
Abkhazia’s economy, Russia’s cash infusions have created a dependency syndrome.
Foreigners cannot own property in Abkhazia, which prevents any substantial
direct foreign investment from other sources.
While
Abkhazia’s economic policy, or lack thereof, might partially explain why the
territory isn’t benefitting from the Sochi Games, Liana Kvarchelia, co-director
of Sokhumi’s Center for Humanitarian Programs, believes other reasons exist.
Over the past several years, an estimated two tons of gravel were taken from
Abkhazia and exported to Russia, she noted. Kvarchelia believes that Abkhaz prices
were lower (figures were not available) and that more could have been taken,
but maintains that Russian companies had their own reasons for wanting to keep
Olympics preparations within their own borders, reasons likely rooted in
corruption. “How else can you explain why they would spend more for Russian
material?” Kvarchelia asked.
Kvarchelia
acknowledges that security concerns are probably the main reason why Russia did
not make greater use of Abkhazia for the Olympics. In September 2013, a Russian
diplomat was murdered in Sokhumi, the territory’s capital; a crime that has
been linked to alleged Islamic extremists. In the spring of 2012, an arms cache
allegedly belonging to members of a radical Islamist group was also discovered.
On January 20,
Russia extended a security for the Olympics 11 kilometers into Abkhazia, a move
that irked Georgia and provoked an expression of concern by NATO
Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. Abkhaz locals turned out to be less
upset by the intrusion of Russian border guards. “They search the cars and
frisk us,” recounted Vakho Pachuliya, a guest-house owner in Gagra. “It’s a
pain, but it’s understandable.” Crossings at Psou, the de-facto northern border
with Russia, are allowed only on foot.
With thousands
of tourists from around the world just across the border in Sochi, local Abkhaz
had thought some would come visit them. But very few have trickled across the
border.
Any thought of
reopening Sokhumi’s commercial airport, closed since the 1992-1993 war with
Tbilisi, has fallen by the wayside. Unlike in the past, the Abkhaz, with a nod
to Russian troops now stationed in Abkhazia, have not named the Georgian
government as a potential security threat during the Games.
In a last
ditch effort to attract visitors, the de-facto foreign ministry lifted entry
requirements three days after the Olympics’ February 7 opening day ceremony for
those wishing to enter Abkhazia via the Russian border. It also has distributed
a YouTube video of young Abkhaz, speaking a
variety of languages, showing off the beauty of the territory’s mountain spots.
In response to the de-facto ministry’s announcement, Tbilisi warned potential
visitors that entering what it still considers to be its sovereign territory
from Russia is considered a crime under Georgian law punishable by up to a
four-year prison-term.
De-facto
Foreign Minister Viacheslav Chirikba admits Sokhumi had big expectations as the
Olympics approached, but says it’s completely natural Abkhazia did not benefit.
“It’s the winter season. We have no tourism and we have increased security. I’m
not disappointed.”
Economist and
independent analyst, Andrei Bgazhba, finds it odd that anybody would have
expected Abkhazia to benefit from the Games. Given the lack of planning, those
who expected it were “fantasizing,” he said. “Really, what could we offer
Russia? Gravel? Sand?” he asked.